

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 NIC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07

H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01

SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OMB-01 DRC-01

IO-14 NEAE-00 /130 W

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P 221329Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3339

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOQTH

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 2178

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CY, TU, UR, GR

SUBJECT: CYPRUS--PRESENT TURKISH POSITION

REF A) STATE 54993; B) NICOSIA 452; C) NICOSIA 453

BEGIN SUMMARY: TURK ATTITUDES TOWARDS CYPRUS, AND POSSIBLY TOWARDS GREECE AS WELL, APPEAR TO BE EVOLVING TOWARDS A TOUGHER LINE. JUST ANNOUNCED STATE VISIT OF DENKTASH IS LATEST EVIDENCE THIS TREND, ALONG WITH CONFIRMATORY REMARKS BY KEY TURK MFA OFFICIAL. LATTER DESCRIBED TO US RECENT SOVIET DEMARCHE IN ANKARA AND PLANNED PARALLELSOVIET DEMARCHE IN ATHENS, WHICH MFA OFFICIAL CLAIMED MAY HAVE BEEN INSPIRED BY MAKARIOS. WHILE INSISTENT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT ANKARA-ATHENS DIALOGUE OF SIGNIFICANCE ON CYPRUS SITUATION, MFA OFFICIAL INDICATED TO US THAT GOG MANEUVERING WITH EOKA-B AND OTHER ACTIONS

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SUGGESTED THAT GOG COULD BE HEADING TOWARDS ANOTHER 1972

STYLE CONFRONTATION WITH MAKARIOS. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING FIRM TURK DENIAL OF GOG-GOT COLLUSION, WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND AGAINST ASSOCIATING OURSELVES IN TURKISH EYES IN ANY WAY WITH RECENT SOVIET DEMARCHES. END SUMMARY.

1. IN A MARCH 20 EVENING REVIEW WITH US OF CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS AND GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS, BARUTCU, IN CHARGE MFA'S CYPRUS-GREECE DEPT, VOLUNTEERED THAT SOVIET CHARGE RECENTLY HAD MADE DEMARCHE TO FONMIN GUNES. CHARGE REFERRED TO ALLEGATIONS OF TURK-GREEK CONSULTATIONS AND POINTED OUT DANGERS OF AN IMPOSED SOLUTION TO CYPRUS PROBLEM. BARUTCU SAID THAT THE FOCUS OF THE DEMARCHE, HOWEVER, WAS ON WHAT ATHENS MIGHT HAVE IN MIND, NOT WHAT ANKARA INTENDED. THE SOVIET CHARGE LEFT WITH THE FONMIN A CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE RELATED DEMARCHE TO BE MADE IN ATHENS BY SOVIET AMB WOULD BE MUCH MORE POINTED.

2. BARUTCU EXHIBITED A MIXTURE OF EMBARRASSMENT AND IRRITATION OVER THIS EFFORT, WHICH HE CLAIMED WAS PROBABLY INSPIRED BY MAKARIOS. (BARUTCU, NORMALLY THE SOFTEST SPOKEN OF ALL TURKS RE MAKARIOS, ON THIS OCCASION VENTED THE BITTEREST CRITICISM OF THE ARCHBISHOP WE HAVE EVER HEARD HIM USE.) AFTER CALMING DOWN, HE SAID INTER ALIA THAT MAKARIOS CHARACTERISTICALLY TRIED TO MANIPULATE THE SOVIETS INTO TAKING SUCH STEPS WHENEVER HE SENSED HIMSELF THREATENED, AS HE DID AT PRESENT, BY THE CLEARLY ANTI-MAKARIOS ACTIVITIES OF THE ATHENS REGIME OR WHEN HE THOUGHT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WERE MAKING PROGRESS. WHEN WE SAID THAT PROGRESS IN THESE TALKS WAS BARELY VISIBLE AND WOULD HARDLY INSPIRE ANY CONCERN ON PART OF MAKARIOS, BARUTCU SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS NOT UNIMPRESSED WITH THE FEW RECENT STEPS THAT HAD BEEN TAKEN AND THAT CHANCES WERE NOW BRIGHTER THAT A TURNING POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE REACHED AS EARLY AS THE SUMMER (HE NOTED THAT OSORIO-TAFALL WOULD BE REMAINING ON THE SCENE AT LEAST UNTIL THEN). AT LEAST, HE SAID, TURKEY AND GREECE WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO JUDGE WHETHER A SETTLEMENT COULD BE NEGOTIATED IN THIS FORUM.

3. WE DID NOT RPT NOT DISCLOSE THAT THE SOVIETS HAD MADE A DEMARCHE IN WASHINGTON.

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4. BARUTCU REPEATEDLY AND INSISTENTLY CLAIMED THERE HAD BEEN NO SERIOUS RECENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN ATHENS AND ANKARA ON ANY ASPECT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. HIS GOT, HE SAID, HAD FROM TIME TO TIME PROPOSED A CLOSER EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ATHENS HAD RESISTED THIS IDEA ON GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE GANGING UP ON GREEK CYPRIOTS.

5. AS FOR ATHENS-NICOSIA RELATIONS, BARUTCU SAID ANKARA WAS CONFIDENT THAT ATHENS WAS GIVING THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SUPPORT TO EOKA-B AND APPEARED ENGAGED IN RELATED WAYS IN A STRONG ANTI-MAKARIOS EFFORT. HE ADMITTED HE WAS UNSURE OF THE PRECISE GREEK OBJECTIVES, REMINDING US THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO GREEK CONSULTATIONS WITH THE TURKS ON THIS ISSUE, BUT THAT PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS CARRIED A STRONG RESEMBLANCE TO THE SITUATION IN EARLY 1972. HE RECALLED THAT TURKEY HAD RECEIVED ONLY A LAST-MINUTE WARNING OF THE GREEK "ULTIMATUM" TO MAKARIOS AT THAT TIME. IF INDEED THE GREEKS HAD SOMETHING SIMILAR IN MIND FOR THIS YEAR, HE ADDED, THEY HAD NOT TOLD THE TURKS AND THE TURKS WERE NOT ASKING QUESTIONS OF THEM.

6. CONTINUING, BARUTCU SAID THAT TURKEY WAS AT PRESENT UNCONCERNED ABOUT THE ATHENS MOVES AND, AS IN 1972, JUDGED THAT THEY COULD WORK MARGINALLY TO TURKEY'S BENEFIT. WHILE THE NATIONALISTI  
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R 221329Z MAR 74  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3340  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY  
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO  
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7. WE ASKED BARUTCU ABOUT RECENT SIGNS THAT THE ECEVIT GOVT WAS ACTUALLY A GREAT DEAL MORE DISPLEASED WITH THE 1973 TURKISH AND TURK CYPRIOT POSITIONS IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS THAN HE, BARUTCU, HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED TO US. BARUTCU ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS A FACT. THE NEW GOVT HAD RESERVATIONS AS TO WHETHER THE INTRODUCTION OF

GREEK AND TURKISH ADVISORS IN EXPANDED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS HAD BEEN A WISE IDEA. THE NEW LEADERSHIP ALSO HAD JUDGED THAT THE DECEMBER DENKTASH PAPER ON LOCAL AUTONOMY DID NOT ADEQUATELY INTRODUCE THE FEDERALIST CAST INTO THE KIND OF GOVT AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION DENKTASH WAS SEEKING. BARUTCU IMPLIED THAT HE PERSONALLY DID NOT GREE WITH THESE CONCERNS, BUT HE STRESSED THAT THIS GOVT WAS GOING TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT ANY SETTLEMENT THAT EMERGED AND MIGHT NOT ACCEPT IT IN THE END. WE SAID TO BARUTCU THAT HE WAS IN EFFECT CLAIMING A ROLE FOR TURKEY WHICH TURKS NORMALLY ASSIGN TO MAKARIOS. BARUTCU BACKED AWAY

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SLIGHTLY BY SAYING THAT THE TURKS WOULD PROBABLY ONLY INSIST ON AN ADDED SECURITY GUARANTEE (OF A NATURE WHICH HE DID NOT DEFINE). "EVEN IF DENKTASH FULLY SUPPORTS THE SETTLEMENT?", WE ASKED. BARUTCU ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, SAYING THAT TURKEY ALSO HAD TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT ITS OWN NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, ADDING THAT THE TURK CYPRIOTS COULD NOT DICTATE TURKEY'S POLICY.

8. WE SAID WE WOULD BE BEARING THIS IN MIND WHEN WE NEXT HEAR DENKTASH MAKING STATEMENTS ABOUT TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION. BARUTCU SAID THAT DENKTASH MADE HIS RECENT STATEMENT IN THIS VEIN ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY, WITHOUT SEEKING APPROVAL OF ANKARA. TURKEY WAS NEVERTHELESS WILLING TO LET HIM SAY WHATEVER HE LIKED, IF ONLY TO COUNTER-BALANCE THE POLEMICS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE.

9. COMMENT: AN EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN TURK POLICIES TOWARDS CYPRUS AND PERHAPS ALSO GREECE MAY BE TAKING PLACE. IT MAY BE SOME TIME, HOWEVER, BEFORE THE TRUE ATTITUDES OF THE ECEVIT GOVT, POSSIBLY THE MOST NATIONALISTIC IN SPIRIT OF ANY GOVT SINCE 1965, HAVE CRYSTALLIZED.

10. THE LATEST SIGN OF A SHIFTING TURK POLICY MAY HAVE EMERGED IN THE GOT MARCH 21 ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE STATE VISIT OF DENKTASH FOR THE WEEK OF MARCH 26-31. EVEN AFTER BECOMING VICE PRESIDENT, DENKTASH NEVER RECEIVED ON AN ANKARA VISIT ANY OF THE CEREMONIAL RED CARPET TREATMENT THAT HE WILL BE GETTING NEXT WEEK. IN OUR OPINION, THIS GESTURE COMING AS IT DID AT SHORT NOTICE, REPRESENTS CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN A SIMPLE EFFORT TO ENHANCE THE LEGITIMACY OF DENKTASH'S OFFICE. IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING NOT ONLY THE ATHENS-NCIOSIA CONTROVERSY BUT ALSO THE SIMMERING TURKISH-GREEK DISPUTE OVER THE AGEAN, WE WILL BE ALERT TO SEE WHETHER MORE EXPLICIT EVIDENCE OF TOUGHER POSITION OF THE ECEVIT GOVT SURFACES AS REGARDS CYPRUS, AND POSSIBLE GREECE AS WELL. THE DENKTASH VISIT ITSELF WILL OF COURSE BE AN OCCASION FOR GOVT STATEMENTS ON CYPRUS AND WILL ALSO PROVIDE THE GOVT AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING CYPRUS ONCE MORE TO THE FOREFRONT OF

PUBLIC ATTENTION.

11. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE US

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NOT ASSOCIATE ITSELF IN TURKISH EYES IN ANY WAY, DIRECTLY OR  
INDIRECTLY, WITH  
THE SOVIET DEMARCHES MADE IN ANKARA, ATHENS AND WASHINGTON.  
BARUTCU CLEARLY WAS RANKLED BY THE SOVIET DEMARCHE, WHICH  
HE REGARDED AS UNJUSTIFIED, AND WE MUST PRESUME IT HAS  
ANNOYED OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GOT AS WELL.

12. EVEN THE SOVIET COUNSELOR IN WASHINGTON  
ADMITTED THAT SOVIETS DID NOT HAVE SOLID EVIDENCE OF GREEK-  
TURKISH COLLUSION. ASIDE FROM THE STRONG DENIALS OF GREEK-TURK  
COLLUSION BARUTCU MADE TO US, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO UNCOVER ANY  
EVIDENCE HERE THAT THE TURKS ARE CONFIDENT OF THE STAYING POWER  
OF THE CURRENT ATHENS REGIME AND CERTAINLY THERE ARE NO  
SIGNS OF THE INTIMACY WHICH OCCASIONALLY DEVELOPED IN  
RELATIONS BETWEEN PREVIOUS TURK GOVTS AND TMI PAPADOPOULOS  
REGIME.  
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